
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, has seen several significant developments since its formation in September 2023 as a mutual defense pact, evolving into a confederation by July 2024. Below is an updated overview incorporating recent developments up to April 28, 2025:
Background
The AES was established on September 16, 2023, through the signing of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, initially as a mutual defense pact in response to the 2023 Nigerien crisis, where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threatened military intervention to restore civilian rule after a coup in Niger. The confederation was formalized on July 6, 2024, at a summit in Niamey, Niger, with the signing of a confederation treaty by the military leaders of the three countries: Mali’s Colonel Assimi Goïta, Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tchiani, and Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré. The AES aims to foster collective defense, economic cooperation, and regional sovereignty, distancing itself from Western influence, particularly France, and ECOWAS.
Recent Developments
- Formal Withdrawal from ECOWAS (January 29, 2025):
- The AES countries officially withdrew from ECOWAS on January 29, 2025, after providing a one-year notice announced on January 28, 2024. This marked a definitive split from the 15-member West African bloc, reversing decades of regional integration. The withdrawal complicates trade and service flows worth approximately $150 billion annually and has been termed “West Africa’s Brexit moment” by some experts. ECOWAS has adopted a six-month exit transition period (January 29 to July 29, 2025) and appointed mediators to engage with AES countries, but the juntas have reiterated their “irrevocable” decision to leave, citing ECOWAS’s perceived inefficacy and foreign influence.
- Establishment of a Joint Military Force:
- In January 2025, the AES announced the creation of a 5,000-strong joint military force to combat jihadist groups and other security threats in the Liptako-Gourma region, the epicenter of the Sahel’s security crisis. Niger’s Defense Minister, Salifou Mody, described the force as a “passport to security,” with deployment planned in the weeks following January 22, 2025. However, analysts express skepticism about its prospects due to the AES countries’ economic constraints (poverty rates exceed 40%, with per capita GDP below $850 in 2022), a history of military human rights abuses, and the failure to address root causes of insecurity like poverty and governance issues.
- Economic and Infrastructure Initiatives:
- The AES has outlined ambitious economic goals, including the creation of an investment bank, a stabilization fund, and a committee to study economic integration. Plans also include facilitating free movement of goods and people, developing transport and communications infrastructure, and investing in agriculture, mining, and energy. For instance, Niger agreed to sell Mali 150 million liters of diesel at a discounted rate in April 2024 to address Mali’s energy shortages. Burkina Faso is focusing on agriculture, while Mali and Niger are restructuring foreign involvement in gold and uranium mining to enhance economic autonomy.
- In November 2024, Mali’s arrest of a CEO and two executives from Resolute Mining on corruption charges sent shockwaves through global markets, signaling a tougher stance on foreign mining firms. Niger has also shifted toward Russian partnerships in uranium mining after severing ties with French company Orano.
- Geopolitical Realignment:
- The AES has deepened ties with non-Western powers, particularly Russia, while expelling French and U.S. forces. Russian military support includes approximately 2,000 Wagner Group/Africa Corps personnel in Mali, 200 in Burkina Faso, and 100 in Niger, alongside agreements for military-technical cooperation, satellite technology, and resource extraction. In April 2024, Russian forces arrived in Niamey, and Niger signed a satellite deal with Russia’s Glavkosmos to enhance security and telecommunications. This shift has raised concerns about the Sahel becoming a proxy war theater.
- The AES countries jointly condemned Ukraine in August 2024, accusing it of supporting rebel groups in northern Mali, aligning with Russian narratives. Ties with Turkey and Iran are also strengthening, further diversifying their partnerships.
- Security Challenges and Criticism:
- Despite the AES’s focus on counterterrorism, insecurity has worsened. In the first half of 2024, fatalities in AES countries reached 7,620, a 9% increase from 2023 and a 190% surge from 2021. Burkina Faso, where nearly half the territory is controlled by terrorist groups, saw over 8,000 deaths in 2023. High-profile attacks include the August 2024 assault by al-Qaida affiliate JNIM in Barsalogho, Burkina Faso (200 killed), and the September 2024 attack on Bamako’s police academy and airport.
- Critics argue that the AES’s military-centric approach, coupled with human rights abuses (e.g., the Malian army’s reported 23 extrajudicial executions in 2020), undermines public trust and fuels jihadist recruitment. The juntas’ crackdowns on dissent, such as Mali’s April 2024 ban on political activities and Burkina Faso’s extended transition to civilian rule (until 2029), have raised concerns about authoritarianism.
- Regional Tensions and Passport Controversy:
- In November 2024, Senegal banned the new AES passport and closed its borders to holders of Mali’s NINA ID card, prompting outcry from AES countries and raising questions about regional integration and free movement. Guinea has supported the AES by defying ECOWAS sanctions and providing port access, enabling Mali to receive Russian grain and fertilizer.
- Relations with ECOWAS and neighboring states remain strained, with disputes like the Benin-Niger border closure impacting trade. ECOWAS’s limited role in counterterrorism and perceptions of Western bias have fueled AES’s narrative of sovereignty.
- Public Sentiment and Legitimacy:
- The AES has garnered some public support by tapping into anti-French and anti-Western sentiment, with juntas framing the alliance as a path to sovereignty and prosperity. Mass rallies, such as those in Niger celebrating French troop withdrawals in December 2023, reflect this sentiment. However, analysts note that the juntas’ populist rhetoric often serves to legitimize their rule amid international isolation, with little progress on restoring civilian governance.
- Posts on X highlight mixed sentiments: some praise the AES as a revolutionary step toward African sovereignty, while others question its effectiveness given rising terrorism since French and Wagner Group withdrawals.
Challenges and Outlook
The AES faces significant hurdles:
- Security: The joint force’s limited funding and capacity, combined with ongoing insurgencies by groups like JNIM and ISSP, cast doubt on its ability to stabilize the region.
- Economic Viability: High poverty rates and reliance on resource extraction make economic integration challenging, especially post-ECOWAS withdrawal.
- Governance: The juntas’ delays in transitioning to civilian rule and suppression of dissent risk alienating populations and undermining legitimacy.
- Regional Isolation: Strained relations with ECOWAS and neighbors like Senegal could hinder trade and mobility, despite Guinea’s support.
Looking ahead, the AES’s success hinges on its ability to deliver tangible security and economic benefits while navigating internal cohesion and external pressures. Its pivot to Russia and other non-Western partners signals a broader geopolitical shift, but persistent instability and governance issues may limit its transformative potential. The confederation’s vision of a unified Sahel identity—moving beyond national borders to create a shared “AES people”—remains aspirational but faces practical and political obstacles.
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